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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the 1898 Utah legislature 
enacted Section 30-2-4, U. C. A., to create consortium equality 
between the spouses* This argument fails because defendant is 
unable to establish that the legislature intended Section 
30-2-4 to affect consortium rights at all. 
Consortium rights are recognized in this country 
because they should be, not because it was easier to give them 
to wives than take them from husbands when the development of 
the law demanded equal protection of the sexes. 
Utah's interpretation of its open courts provision 
creates a limitation on the legislature's ability to completely 
eliminate a cause of action existing at the time of the 
adoption of the state constitution. Some jurisdictions may 
interpret the provision to only require that the state provide 
its citizens with courts, but such is not the case in Utah. 
The current interpretation of Section 30-2-4 is unjust 
and works evil in a legal sense. 
Placing a cause of action for loss of consortium in 
the directly-insured spouse, rather than in the spouse who 
actually lost the consortium, is a scheme fraught with hazard. 
Defendant's real reason for suggesting it is that it serves the 
interest of defendant's insurer. 
The ruling on this case should be applied to these 
parties. Prospective application is made when the parties have 
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relied on a ruling of law that is now being overturned. There 
has been no reliance by this defendant or anyone else in this 
state on a continuation of the denial of consortium rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS CONTENTION THAT THE 
LEGISLATURE COULD ELIMINATE A HUSBANDS 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 
FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER 
ESTABLISHES THAT THAT WAS WHAT THE 
LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO DO. 
Defendant attempts to establish that the 1898 Utah 
legislature enacted Section 30-2-4, Utah Code Annotated, to 
create consortium equality between the spouses by intentionally 
denying the husband his common-law consortium right, thereby 
putting him on equal footing with his consortium-less wife. 
Defendant's only basis for this claim is a 
misstatement of plaintiff's argument. Plaintiff argued in her 
brief that this Court's interpretation of 30-2-4 in Ellis v. 
Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 (1972) holding that the 
statute took away a husband's action for loss of consortium was 
erroneous. (Plaintiff's Brief at 18-21.) 
Defendant restates and misstates plaintiff's argument 
thusly: 
"Second, the legislature recognized the 
inequality of no right to loss of consortium in 
the wife and remedied it by eliminating the 
husband's right to recovery." 
(Defendant's Brief at 4.) 
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Plaintiff made no such argument. And defendant 
offers nothing else m the way of legislative history or 
statutory intent to support his claim that the 1898 
legislature intended to eliminate consortium rights. 
II. THE VAST MAJORITY OF AMERICAN 
JURISDICTIONS RECOGNIZE CONSORTIUM 
RIGHTS BECAUSE IT IS EQUITABLE TO DO 
SO, NOT BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
"DISTRUPTIVE" TO NOT DO SO. 
Defendant cites one commentator who believes that 49 
American jurisdictions have achieved consortium-equality by 
giving the right to wives, rather than taking it from husbands, 
because to have taken it from husbands would have been 
''disruptive" to the state's body of jurisprudence. 
(Defendant's Brief at 6.) 
Defendant's argument, reduced to its essentials, is 
that were we to start fresh and completely rewrite our law, the 
wiser course would be to not recognize relational interests, 
particularly consortium. This court has already ruled that 
relational interests do and should enjoy the protection of the 
law: 
"To say that the law recognizes no loss for 
intangible injuries resulting from a 
wrongful death is repugnant to basic human 
values and flouts basic principles of 
justice," 
Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah, 1982). 
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Further, the soundness of the commentator's belief is 
questionable for at least two states, California and 
Massachusetts, originally ruled in agreement with it by denying 
the husband his right to loss of consortium. Deshotel v. 
Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry.Co., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958); 
West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal.2d 469, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289, 353 
P.2d 929 (I960); and Lombardo v. D.F. Frangioso & Co., Inc., 
Mass. Adv. Sh. (1971) 873. 
Nonetheless, California and Massachusetts both later 
reversed themselves and allowed consortium rights to both 
spouses. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 
115 Cal Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669 (1974); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 364 Mass 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973). 
Plaintiff submits that the law places a higher 
priority- on being fair and just than on protecting itself from 
"disruption" simply because that is the way it has always been 
done. The purpose of the law is to right wrongs, not 
perpetuate them. 
III. DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
LEGISLATURE CAN ELIMINATE A COMMON-
LAW RIGHT IN UTAH IS UNSUPPORTED. 
Defendant cites a number of cases to contest 
plaintiff's contention that Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, the "Open Courts" provision, prohibits the 
legislature from completely abolishing a common-law right. 
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However only one is from Utah, Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 
38 P. 20 (1906). (Defendant's Brief at 7-9.) 
Defendant's reliance on Hilton, which considers the 
abrogation of dower, is misplaced for in the case of dower, the 
legislature replaced that right with a comparable one which 
provided that one-third of the husband's real property 
possessed during marriage would go to the wife if she survived 
him. Revised Statutes of 1898, Section 2826. 
The editorial board comment to Section 75-2-113, 
U.C.A., the current Utah statute abolishing the estates of 
dower and curtesy states, ,fThe provisions of this code replace 
the common-law concepts of dower and curtesy and their 
statutory counterparts." 
In addition to dower and curtesy, defendant cites 
Utah's criminal code as an example of the Utah legislature's 
power to abolish common-law rights. However, common law 
crimes were replaced with a statutory criminal code. Title 76, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
As plaintiff has previously argued, substitution of 
rights or remedies does not offend the Open Courts provision. 
(Plaintiff's Brief at 10-16.) 
The constitutional provision prohibits the total 
elimination of a common law right and failure to replace it 
with some substantive remedy. Plaintiff does not argue that 
the state is "locked into" the common law or that it cannot 
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change it. None of defendant's cited cases from Utah violates 
the constitutional command in the manner the elimination of the 
consortium right does. 
While defendant does cite cases from other 
jurisdictions which interpret the Open Courts provision as only 
requiring access to courts to enforce rights (Defendant's Brief 
at 9), it is clear from previous statements and holdings of 
this court that the correct interpretation in Utah is that the 
provision places a limitation on legislative ability to affect 
common law rights. (Plaintiff's Brief at 14-16). 
IV. THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 
30-2-4 WHICH 
FOR INJURIES 
UNJUST 
DENIES SPOUSES 
TO 
AND WORKS 
THEIR 
EVIL 
COMPENSATION 
RELATIONSHIPS IS 
IN A LEGAL SENSE. 
Defendant states that the standard for avoiding the 
rule of stare decisis is that the rule of law questioned ,fis 
unjust or works some evil in a legal sense." (Defendant's 
Brief at 12-) 
There is no question that such is the case here. 
Forty-nine American jurisdictions have found that justice 
requires that a cause of action for loss of consortium be 
recognized. (Plaintiff's Brief at Appendix, and at 26.) And 
the rule is evil in a legal sense in that it violates Utah's 
constitutional mandate against eliminating a common-law right. 
(Argument III, supra.) 
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V. DEFENDANTS SUGGESTION THAT A RIGHT TO LOSS 
OF CONSORTIUM, EVEN IF RECOGNIZED, SHOULD 
REMAIN IN THE INJURED PARTY AS AN ELEMENT 
OF DAMAGE IS FRAUGHT WITH HAZARD AND SERVES 
ONLY THE INTEREST OF DEFENDANTS INSURER, 
NOT DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues that all conflicts between case law, 
statutes and constitutional provisions can be resolved by 
vesting the indirectly-injured spouse's causes of action in the 
directly-injured spouse and merely making loss of consortium an 
element of damages in the case-in-chief. Defendant's argument 
seeks to minimize and pooh-pooh the injuries a wife suffers 
when her husband is severely injured. 
As this brief is written, it has been two and a half 
years since the collision giving rise to it took place. 
Plaintiff did not present evidence at trial, as her 
case was dismissed when the trial began. Had she presented 
evidence it would have been that she was 22 at the time of the 
accident, had two children with a third born after the 
accident, and that she and her husband, Nick Cruz, had just 
purchased and started into operation a restaurant in Eureka, 
Utah. Nick had no other source of income, they lost the 
restaurant, and the family was entirely dependent on her 
earnings as their sole source of income. To trial, 23 months 
after the accident, Nick had not been able to work a day. For 
that period, she worked fulltime, and all the overtime she 
could get at a job in Provo near their home. She cared for the 
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children, the house and Nick during the long periods he was 
bedridden or in his half-body cast. 
Now Nick's Judgment is in hand, the financial pressure 
is reduced, but he is still not well and their life is still 
not back to normal. 
In effect, defendant sentenced plaintiff to 23 months 
heavy labor. That is a long time for a young mother. This is 
not a wrong done Nick. It is a wrong done her. Plaintiff's 
injuries are real and genuine. To lump them in with her 
husband's claim is a bald attempt to lose them in the shuffle. 
Plaintiff is at a loss to determine defendant's legal basis for 
taking the causes of action of two people and giving them to 
one of them. 
The State of Kansas treats consortium claims as 
defendant suggests. The case of Albertson v. Travis, 576 P.2d 
1090 (Kan.App. 1978), is a study in why such a scheme is 
ill-advised. 
Under Kansas law, a settlement with a husband in a 
personal injury action is recognized as closing the incident. 
Hoffman v. Dantel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615 (1964). A wife 
is left at her husband's mercy to bring the consortium claim. 
In Albertson, a husband failed to bring his wife's claim for 
loss of consortium. Subsequently, they were divorced. Her 
only alternative at that point was to sue him for his failure 
to claim her losses. This would most likely be pointless 
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because he may well be incapacitated and unable to satisfy any 
judgment she obtained against him. And even were he able to 
satisfy the judgment, the real tortfeasor has escaped and the 
damages are coming from one who has been injured and is quite 
possibly living on his settlement. 
Further, defendant's proposal would be a violation of 
Section 30-2-4 which, all agree, vests a wife's cause of action 
for her injuries in her. Defendant suggests that the wife's 
claim be given to the husband and that he sue on it. Such 
would be a clear violation of the Married Women's Act. 
Defendant argues that such a scheme will harmonize and 
synthesize the cases, statutes and constitutional provisions at 
issue herein, without explaining exactly how, plaintiff might 
add. Defendant's fftwo-causes-of-action-in-one-plaintiffff plan 
actually creates conflict with other established Utah case law 
that would have to be resolved were his plan adopted. 
Plaintiff refers to the rule that money received in a 
personal injury judgment or settlement by a married person 
belongs solely to that person and the spouse has no interest 
therein. Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1981). 
Defendant's plan would require reexamination and 
modification of that caselaw, for one spouse would have been 
awarded damages which were for the other's losses. The rule of 
Izatt would be inappropriate in that circumstance. 
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Indeed the proposal seems rife with questions for 
adjudication. Would the indirectly-injured spouse have the 
right to intervene in the main action? How would one spouse 
disgorge the award from the other, if such became necessary? 
What would the statute of limitations on such a suit be? 
Plaintiff is unaware of any other area of the lav; 
where the cause of action of a legally competent adult is given 
to another to prosecute. Isn't that the situation that the 
Married Women's Acts were designed to eliminate? 
The real motivation for defendant's suggestion has 
little to do with defendant's interests. The real beneficiary 
of the adoption of this suggestion would be defendant's 
insurer. Automobile liability policies provide a maximum 
amount payable per each injured party as well as per accident. 
If both spouses had a cause of action against the tortfeasor, 
there would be two injured parties eligible to recover from the 
policy and therefore the insurer would be potentially liable 
for maximum limits for two persons. 
Under defendant's insurer's scheme, there would be 
only one plaintiff and he or she would have the cause of action 
for the spouse also. Thus, there would be only one injured 
party and the insurer would be potentially liable for the 
maximum limit for only one person. Its potential losses would 
be cut by 50%. Additionally, if the combined claims exceeded 
the policy limit, the injured parties would not be fully 
compensated. 
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VI. DEFENDANT'S SUGGESTION THAT A RULING 
IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR SHOULD BE GIVEN 
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION ONLY IS GROUNDLESS, 
It is ludicrous for defendant to argue that the people 
of this state have relied on the law not recognizing a cause of 
action for loss of consortium when they have purchased 
automobile liability insurance. (Defendant's Brief at 18.) 
Just as this court recognized that the people of this 
state knew nothing of the Guest Statute, Malan v. Lewis, Utah 
Supreme Court No. 17606 (May 1, 1984), the people of this state 
are likewise unaware of whether there's a cause of action for 
loss of consortium. Defendant's argument that the good 
citizens of this state have made a conscious decision, when 
they purchase liability insurance, to purchase a particular 
amount because Utah recognizes no cause of action for loss of 
consortium is simply far-fetched. The only legal persons who 
may have relied on that aspect of Utah law are the insurance 
companies of this state in setting their rates. Those rates 
are frequently adjusted due to any number of reasons, including 
decisions of this court which are, as defendant acknowledges, 
generally applied retroactively to the parties involved. 
Respondent cites the case of Loyal Order of Moose, No. 
259 v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 
P.2d 257 (Utah, 1982), wherein the facts are completely 
dissimilar to those at bar. That case involved a property tax 
ruling which non-profit organizations had relied on for 
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decades. The crucial criteria in determining retroactive or 
prospective application seems to be reliance by parties 
affected by the decision. Id. at 265. It has no application or 
bearing here. 
Plaintiff challenges defendant to argue that defendant 
was relying on Utah's not recognizing a cause of action for 
loss of consortium on the night he caused the collision with 
Nicholas Cruz. Plaintiff would wager that defendant didn't 
even know the oncoming driver was married. 
Lori Cruz did not bring this appeal because she has an 
academic interest in whether Utah recognizes this cause of 
action. Lori Cruz brought this appeal because she has been 
hurt and because she believes that Jed Wright should compensate 
her for the life he has caused her to lead for the past two and 
a half years and that she will continue to lead. There is no 
reason to deny her redress for her injuries while acknowledging 
that from now on such injuries will be compensable for everyone 
else. 
The facts of the Guest Statute case, Malan v. Lewis, 
supra, are more on point with the ones at bar than the Loyal 
Order case. Both involve auto accidents. Both involve parties 
injured as the result of another's negligence. There is no 
reliance on a rule of law in such a situation. In Malan, the 
matter was remanded for trial on the merits. Such should be 
the disposition here. 
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Defendant further argues for prospective application 
oy conjuring up all vision of obstacles, none of which exist in 
this case, and which can be ruled on when properly presented to 
this court. Defendant is concerned whether Utah will require 
the consortium claim to be joined with the original claim. 
That is not an issue here because it was. Defendant is 
concerned about the effect of comparative negligence on the 
consortium claim. That is also not an issue here because the 
jury found there was none. 
Defendant is concerned that a jury might award a 
double recovery because it will be a different jury from the 
one that heard the original case. The jury system is built on 
jury instructions. The plaintiff has confidence that a 
well-drafted set of jury instructions will effectively lay to 
rest defendant's concerns on this issue. The jurors will be 
instructed as to which injuries have already been compensated 
for and which injuries still require compensation. 
There is no greater burden on this defendant by 
application of this ruling to these parties than if Utah had 
already recognized this cause of action on the night of the 
collision. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to establish that the 1898 
legislature wished to eliminate consortium rights. Defendant 
cites authority from other jurisdictions holding that there is 
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no constitutional violation in such a legislative act while 
ignoring this court's pronouncements on the issue. 
Defendantf s suggestion that a consortium right should 
vest in the directly-injured spouse is unworkable and would set 
this plaintiff1 s legal rights back 100 years. Finallyir 
defendant's argument that the people of this state have relied 
on Utah's not recognizing a cause of action for loss of 
consortium when they purchase insurance is ludicrous. 
Plaintiff submits that the ruling of the District 
Court should be reversed and remanded for determination of 
DATED July (/<s , 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitutional Provisions 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from pro-
secuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution. 
Statutes 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, maintain 
an action therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own 
right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the preser-
vation and protection of her rights and property as if unmarried. 
There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on account 
of personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected 
therewith, but the wife may recover against a third person for 
such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall 
include expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid 
or assumed by the husband. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4 
The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 75-2-113 
Wife's interest in husband's real property. One-third in 
value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property 
possessed by the husband at any time during the marriage, and 
to which the wife had made no relinquishment of her rights, shall 
be set apart as her property in fee simple if "she survive him; 
prqvided, that the wife shall not be entitled to any interest 
under the provisions of this section in any such estate of 
which the husband has made a conveyance when the wife, at the 
time of the conveyance, is not or never has been a resident of 
the territory or state of Utah, Property distributed under the 
provisions of this section shall be free from all debts of the 
decedent, except those secured by mechanics' or laborers' liens 
for work or labor done or material furnished exclusively for 
the improvement of the same, and except those created for the 
purchase thereof and for taxes levied thereon. The value of 
such part of the homestead as may be set aside to the widow 
shall be deducted from the distributive share, provided for her 
in this section. In cases wherein only the heirs, devisees, 
and legatees of the decedent are interested, the property 
secured to the widow by this section may be set off by the 
court in due process of administration. 
Revised Statutes of 1898, Section 2826 
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